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SURVEY OF NEW YORK PRACTICE
ARTICLE 31-DIsCLOSURE

CPLR 3117(a) (2): Use of party's deposition by adversely interested party subject to trial court's discretionary power to control
proceedings
CPLR 3117(a)(2) authorizes the use of a party's deposition by
an adverse party "for any purpose." 6 Pursuant to this provision, a
deposition may be admitted into evidence for impeachment purposes or as evidence in chief3 7 notwithstanding that the deponent
is available to testify as a witness.3 8 Nevertheless, it had never
been expressly determined whether a trial court, in the exercise of
at 9-36. Therefore, if it appears that the defendant will be able to establish nonreliance by
the named plaintiff on the alleged misrepresentations, the court may find it necessary to
decertify the class to preserve the rights of members of the class who are not before it.
31CPLR 3117(a)(2) (Supp. 1980-1981) provides:
At the trial or upon the hearing of a motion or an interlocutory proceeding, any
part or all of a deposition, so far as admissible under the rules of evidence, may be
used in accordance with any of the following provisions:
(2) the deposition of a party or of any one who at the time of taking the
deposition was an officer, director, member, or managing or authorized agent of a
party, or the deposition of an employee of a party produced by that party, may be
used for any purpose by any adversely interested party ....
CPLR 3117(a) was adapted in part from the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, FMRsT REP.
146, and is virtually identical to rule 32(a)(2) of the federal rules. See generally 4A J.
MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 1 32.01 (2d ed. 1980).
'7 See United Bank Ltd. v. Cambridge Sporting Goods Corp., 41 N.Y.2d 254, 263, 360
N.E.2d 943, 951, 392 N.Y.S.2d 265, 273 (1976); Spampinato v. A.B.C. Consol. Corp., 35
N.Y.2d 283, 286-87, 319 N.E.2d 196, 198, 360 N.Y.S.2d 878, 880 (1974); Gonzalez v. Medina,
69 App. Div. 2d 14, 21-22, 417 N.Y.S.2d 953, 958 (lst Dep't 1979); In re Estate of Schaich,
55 App. Div. 2d 914, 914, 391 N.Y.S.2d 135, 136 (2d Dep't 1977); Rodford v. Sample, 30
App. Div. 2d 588, 588, 290 N.Y.S.2d 30, 32 (3d Dep't 1968); CPLR 3117, commentary at 491
(1970); 3A WK&M 1 3117.04. It has been noted that CPLR 3117(a)(2) was intended "to
authorize the use of a party's deposition unlimitedly against the deponent." SIXTH REP. 318.
38 See Spampinato v. A.B.C. Consol. Corp., 35 N.Y.2d 283, 285, 319 N.E.2d 196, 198,
360 N.Y.S.2d 878, 880 (1974); Perkins v. New York Racing Ass'n, 51 App. Div. 2d 585, 586,
378 N.Y.S.2d 757, 759 (2d Dep't 1976); General Ceramics Co. v. Schenley Products Co., 262
App. Div. 528, 529, 30 N.Y.S.2d 540, 541 (1st Dep't 1941); cf. Fey v. Walston & Co., 493 F.2d
1036, 1046 (7th Cir. 1974); Fenstermacher v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 493 F.2d 333, 338 (3d
Cir. 1974); Pingatore v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 419 F.2d 1138, 1142 (6th Cir. 1969), cert.
denied, 398 U.S. 928 (1970); Community Counselling Serv., Inc. v. Reilly, 317 F.2d 239, 243
(4th Cir. 1963); Pursche v. Atlas Scraper & Eng'r Co., 300 F.2d 467, 488-89 (9th Cir. 1961),
cert. denied, 371 U.S. 911 (1962) (federal rule 32(a)(2) allows introduction of party's deposition notwithstanding his prior testimony or unavailability). Notably, however, if the deponent is a nonparty witness his deposition may not be used as evidence in chief, unless one of
the unavailability requirements enumerated in CPLR 3117(a)(3) is satisfied. 3A WK&M 1
3117.04. See Wojtas v. Fifth Ave. Coach Corp., 23 App. Div. 2d 685, 685, 257 N.Y.S.2d 404,
405 (2d Dep't 1965).
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its general discretionary powers,3 9 could refuse evidence rendered
admissible by the statute.4 0 Recently, however, in Feldsberg v.
Nitschke," the Court of Appeals held that the refusal to allow a
deposition to be used for impeachment purposes after the partydeponent had been recalled for redirect examination does not constitute an abuse of the trial court's discretion.4 2
3'
The trial court's discretionary power to control the litigation before it is well settled.
In the exercise of its discretion, the court for example may determine the sequence of a trial,
Tomassi v. Town of Union, 58 App. Div. 2d 670, 671, 395 N.Y.S.2d 747, 749 (3d Dep't 1977),
and the order of introducing evidence, Philadelphia & Trenton R.R. v. Stimpson, 39 U.S.
(13 Pet.) 448, 463 (1840); Agate v. Morrison, 84 N.Y. 672, 673 (1881); Blake v. People, 73
N.Y. 586, 587 (1878); Widera v. Widera, 200 Misc. 753, 758, 104 N.Y.S.2d 698, 703 (Sup. Ct.
Kings County 1951); and allow a reopening of the case "to supply omissions or to receive
further testimony." Barson v. -Mulligan, 77 App. Div. 192, 194, 79 N.Y.S. 31, 33 (1st Dep't
1902). See also People v. Ferrone, 204 N.Y. 551, 553, 98 N.E. 8, 8 (1912); Forde v. Forde, 53
App. Div. 2d 779, 779, 384 N.Y.S.2d 547, 548 (3d Dep't 1976); Plohn v. Plohn, 283 App. Div.
842, 842, 129 N.Y.S.2d 58, 59 (3d Dep't 1954). The determination of whether a witness is to
be excluded from the courtroom to guard against perjury is also subject to the trial court's
discretion, People v. Cooke, 292 N.Y. 185, 190-91, 54 N.E.2d 357, 360 (1944); Philpot v.
Fifth Ave. Coach Corp., 142 App. Div. 811, 813, 128 N.Y.S. 35, 37 (lst Dep't 1911), as is the
manner and extent of cross-examination, People v. Ramistella, 306 N.Y. 379, 384, 118
N.E.2d 566, 569 (1954); Friedal v. Board of Regents, 296 N.Y. 347, 352, 73 N.E.2d 545, 548
(1947); People v. Malkin, 250 N.Y. 185, 197, 164 N.E. 900, 905 (1928), and the extent of an
examination to show the hostility of a witness, People v. Sorge, 301 N.Y. 198, 202, 93 N.E.2d
637, 640 (1950); People v. Lustig, 206 N.Y. 162, 172, 99 N.E. 183, 186 (1912); People v.
Brooks, 131 N.Y. 321, 326, 30 N.E. 189, 190-91 (1892). See generally People v. Pollard, 54
App. Div. 2d 1012, 388 N.Y.S.2d 164 (3d Dep't 1976); Siberfield v. Swiss Bank Corp., 268
App. Div. 884, 50 N.Y.S.2d 841 (2d Dep't 1944); Mohawk Carpet Mills v. State, 173 Misc.
319, 17 N.Y.S.2d 780 (Ct. Cl. 1940); 1 M. BENDER, NEw YORK EVIDENCE § 25.01, at 104-12
(1979); W. RICHARDSON, EVIDENCE § 459 (10th ed. 1973); 4 WK&M § 4011.04-05.
40 Although the extent to which a trial court, in the exercise of its discretion, could
override the provisions of paragraph (a)(2) of CPLR 3117 was unclear, at least one lower
court bad indicated that its discretion was not constrained by the express language of paragraph (a)(3). In Josbe v. Connolly, 60 Misc. 2d 69, 302 N.Y.S.2d 35 (N.Y.C. Civ. Ct. Bronx
County 1969), after noting that "[a] deposition occupies no special place in the law of evidence," the court held that even though the statutory prerequisite to admissibility-the
unavailability of the deponent-apparently had been satisfied, the deposition evidence nevertheless was inadmissible because the deponent's unavailability was caused by the party
seeking to use the deposition. Id. at 70, 302 N.Y.S.2d at 37. Notably, the court acknowledged that the statute did not impose this condition on the right to utilize the deposition.
Id. Rather, considerations of justice and fairness, according to the court, compelled it to
engraft the limitation on the express statutory language. Id. at 71, 302 N.Y.S.2d at 37.
On the federal level, the courts have exercised their discretionary power to limit the use
of a deposition to exclude repetitious or immaterial matter and to require identification of
pertinent portions by specific offer. See Fey v. Walston & Co., 493 F.2d 1036, 1046 (7th Cir.
1974); Zimmerman v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 410 F.2d 1041, 1044 n.5 (D.C. Cir. 1969); Cleary
v. Indiana Beach, Inc., 275 F.2d 543, 550-51 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 825 (1960).
41 49 N.Y.2d 636, 404 N.E.2d 1293, 427 N.Y.S.2d 751 (1980), af'g, 66 App. Div. 2d 757,
412 N.Y.S.2d 2 (1st Dep't 1978).
42 49 N.Y.2d at 640, 404 N.E.2d at 1295, 427 N.Y.S.2d at 753.
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Feldsberg was a personal injury and wrongful death action
arising out of an automobile accident.43 During the trial, at which
there was conflicting testimony -on the issue of negligence, the
plaintiffs called the defendant as their witness, and after he was
excused, requested that he be available to testify concerning certain photographs of the accident scene. 4" The court granted the
plaintiffs' request but emphasized that the recall was not to be for
the purpose of repeating conflicts or testimony already covered.4 5
On recall, however, the plaintiffs sought to use the defendant's
deposition to point out an inconsistency in his testimony. 4 Stating
that the use of the deposition was a "further examination of the
defendant," the Supreme Court, New York County, ruled that the
plaintiffs' counsel could not make any additional use of the defendant's deposition. 4 After judgment for the defendant, the Appellate Division, First Department, specifically addressing the plaintiffs' objection to the trial court's ruling on the use of the
deposition, affirmed.' 8
On appeal, a divided Court of Appeals affirmed the appellate
division.'9 Chief Judge Cooke, writing for the majority, 50 noted at
the outset that absent a "clear abuse of discretion," a trial court's
power to control the course of the proceedings overrides a party's
right to introduce evidence which is nevertheless technically admissible. 51 The Court stated that since all relevant testimony
should be brought out upon initial examination of a witness, 52 a
trial court's decision to restrict the scope of examination following
recall places "reasonable limits" on the proceedirigs and relieves
"untoward administrative burdens."5 3 Recognizing that CPLR
3117(a)(2) does not confer "any special qualities" upon a deposition, the majority stated that a court's discretionary power to con13 Id. at 641, 404 N.E.2d at 1295, 427 N.Y.S.2d at 753.
44 Id.
"I Id.

at 641-42, 404 N.E.2d at 1296, 427 N.Y.S.2d at 754.
46Id. Asserting that CPLR 3117(a)(2) permitted the use of the deposition without the
defendant being present on the stand, the plaintiffs' attorney requested permission to introduce the deposition with the defendant present as a witness. Id.
47 Id.
48 66 App. Div. 2d 757, 412 N.Y.S.2d 2 (1st Dep't 1978).
" 49 N.Y.2d at 640, 404 N.E.2d at 1295, 427 N.Y.S.2d at 753.
50 Judges Jasen, Gabrielli, and Jones joined Chief Judge Cooke in the majority. Judge
Meyer dissented in an opinion in which Judges Wachtler and Fuchsberg concurred.
5149 N.Y.2d at 643, 404 N.E.2d at 1296, 427 N.Y.S.2d at 754.
5 Id. at 644, 404 N.E.2d at 1297, 427 N.Y.S.2d at 755.
53 Id.
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trol the use of testimonial evidence extends to the use of depositions.5 4 In the majority's view, the plaintiffs, having had sufficient
opportunity to demonstrate an inconsistency in the defendant's
testimony, 55 should not be allowed to use a deposition to circumvent a restriction placed on the reexamination of the party witness. 6 Indeed, the Feldsberg Court concluded, a contrary holding
would establish a "per se rule" under which a trial judge would be
stripped of the discretionary power to preclude "unnecessary repe'57
tition or unfair surprise simply because a deposition is involved.
Authoring a dissenting opinion, Judge Meyer argued that although CPLR 3117(a)(2) does not give a party an indefeasible
right to introduce a deposition at any point in the trial, the admissibility of a deposition is not exclusively within the discretion of
the trial court.58 Emphasizing the policy considerations favoring
the introduction of relevant and material evidence, the dissent
contended that all admissible evidence should be received unless it
is demonstrated that unfairness to the opposing party would result.59 Since a showing of unfairness was absent from the record,
Judge Meyer stated that the exclusion of the deposition by the
judge was clearly an abuse of discretion.6 0 Moreover, since the deposition evidence "bore materially" on the testimony proffered by
both the plaintiff and the defendant, Judge Meyer concluded that
its exclusion was prejudicial error.8 1
Id. See generally note 39 supra.
5 A possible inconsistency appeared between the defendant's oral testimony and his
deposition concerning the point at which the plaintiff's decedent, a pedestrian, crossed in
front of the defendant's vehicle. At his pretrial examination, the defendant stated that the
deceased was 20 feet away when he went directly in front of the defendant. 49 N.Y.2d at
651, 404 N.E.2d at 1301, 427 N.Y.S.2d at 759 (Meyer, J., dissenting). At the trial, however,
the defendant testified that the distance between him and the decedent ranged from 5 to 50
yards at different points in time. Id. (Meyer, J., dissenting).
0' Id. at 644-45, 404 N.E.2d at 1297-98, 427 N.Y.S.2d at 756.
5
Id. at 645, 404 N.E.2d at 1298, 427 N.Y.S.2d at 756.
" Id. at 646-47, 404 N.E.2d at 1299, 427 N.Y.S.2d at 757 (Meyer, J., dissenting).
11 Id. (Meyer, J., dissenting).
60 Id. at 650, 404 N.E.2d at 1301, 427 N.Y.S.2d at 759 (Meyer, J., dissenting). Judge
Meyer stated that the trial court ruling was not based upon a determination that the admission of the deposition would be unfair, rather the decision to exclude the evidence apparently reflected the trial judge's erroneous view that the plaintiffs, in electing to call the
defendant and to use his deposition concurrently, could not thereafter use the deposition
alone. Id. at 649, 404 N.E.2d at 1300-01, 427 N.Y.S.2d at 759 (Meyer, J., dissenting).
61Id. at 650, 404 N.E.2d at 1301, 427 N.Y.S.2d at 759 (Meyer, J., dissenting). Concluding that the trial court's abuse of discretion was not harmless error, the dissent reasoned
that the inconsistency between the defendant's deposition and oral testimony would have
been significant to the jury on the issue of the decedent's contributory negligence-a de-
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It is submitted that the Feldsberg Court properly determined
that the discretionary power of the trial court to control the admission of evidence is not limited by CPLR 3117(a)(2). e2 Although this
provision gives a party the right to use an adversary's deposition
"for any purpose,"6 it does not establish an absolute right to use
the deposition at any time during the trial.6 4 Indeed, since the deposition is a substitute for live testimony, 5 any restriction which
fense which the defendant has the burden of establishing in a combined wrongful death and
personal injury action brought on a claim accruing, as here, prior to September 1, 1975. Id.
at 650-51, 404 N.E.2d at 1301, 427 N.Y.S.2d at 759 (Meyer, J., dissenting); see note 55
supra. See generally EPTL § 5-4.2 (Supp. 1980-1981).
62 See note 38 supra. The discretionary power vested in a trial court is not expressly
limited by the CPLR. Martin v. Marshall, 25 App. Div. 2d 594, 596, 266 N.Y.S.2d 992, 995
(3d Dep't), appeal denied, 18 N.Y.2d 579 (1966); 4 WK&M 1 4011.03. Indeed, CPLR provisions relating to disclosure expressly reaffirm the trial court's discretionary powers. CPLR
3103(a) provides:
The court may at any time on its own initiative ... make a protective order denying, limiting, conditioning or regulating the use of any disclosure device. Such
order shall be designed to prevent unreasonable annoyance, expense, embarrassment, disadvantage, or other prejudice to any person or the courts.
CPLR 3103(a) (1970); see Estates Roofing Co. v. Savo, 85 Misc. 2d 1028, 1028, 381 N.Y.S.2d
198, 199 (Dist. Ct. Suffolk County 1976).
CPLR 4011 provides that "[tihe court may determine the sequence in which the issues
shall be tried and otherwise regulate the conduct of the trial in order to achieve a speedy
and unprejudiced disposition of the matters at issue in a setting of proper decorum." CPLR
4011 (1963). This statute, it has been suggested, "merely [restates] the inherent discretionary power of a court." 4 WK&M 4011.03, at 40-21.
63 CPLR 3117(a)(2) (Supp. 1980-1981) (emphasis added).
In permitting a party's deposition to be introduced by an adversary as evidence of
the facts asserted, CPLR 3117(a)(2) is consistent with the traditional admissions exception
to the hearsay rule. 3A WK&M 3117.04. Although a deposition is hearsay evidence when
used to prove the truth of its contents, an adversary's deposition is admissible under the
admissions exception to the hearsay rule. Josbe v. Connolly, 60 Misc. 2d 69, 70-71, 302
N.Y.S.2d 35, 37 (N.Y.C. Civ. Ct. Bronx County 1969); see United Bank Ltd. v. Cambridge
Sporting Goods Corp., 41 N.Y.2d 254, 264, 360 N.E.2d 943, 951, 392 N.Y.S.2d 265, 273
(1976); CPLR 3117, commentary at 490-91 (1970). See generally 4 J. WIGMoRE, EVIDENCE §
1048 (3d ed. 1940). The extent of its use, however, will be subject to the trial court's discretion. See Swick v. White, 18 Ariz. App. 519, 522, 504 P.2d 50, 52 (Ct. App. 1972); Deffendoll
v. Stupp Bros. Bridge & Iron Co., 415 S.W.2d 36, 40 (Mo. Ct. App. 1967); Rolfe v. Olson, 87
N.J. Super. 242, 245, 208 A.2d 817, 819 (Super. Ct. App. Div. 1965); Celeste v. State, 56
Misc. 2d 991, 994, 290 N.Y.S.2d 64, 67 (Ct. Cl. 1968), aff'd, 40 App. Div. 2d 880, 337
N.Y.S.2d 252 (3d Dep't 1972); Brown v. Bryant, 244 Or. 321, 323, 417 P.2d 1002, 1004
(1966).
65 Vicherek v. Papanek, 281 App. Div. 498, 500, 120 N.Y.S.2d 197, 203 (1st Dep't 1953).
Legally, "[the deposition] is indeed a substitute for the physical appearance of the witness
on the trial and has exactly the same effect as proof of any fact within his knowledge or
observation as his oral testimony would have." Id.; see 1 M. BENDER, NEW YORK EVIDENCE §
25.04 (1979). Although the taking of a deposition is similar to the eliciting of testimony of a
witness, there is a practical distinction in that the trier of facts is deprived of the opportunity to observe the demeanor of the deponent. See Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464, 469-70
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might be placed on the examination of a witness should be equally
applicable to the use of the deponent's written statement. In reaffirming the broad common-law powers of the trial court to control
the conduct of the litigation,6 6 the Feldsberg Court has recognized
that the mere fact that evidence has been rendered admissible by
statute should not necessarily mandate its admission.
It is suggested, however, that the holding in Feldsberg should
not be interpreted as conferring upon the trial court unfettered
discretion to exclude material and relevant evidence. As the dissent correctly pointed out, all evidence having probative value is
admissible unless forbidden by a specific rule.6 7 Thus, unless unfair
prejudice would result, any conflict between the trial court's discretion to control the proceedings and the admission of material
and relevant evidence generally should be resolved in favor of inclusion of the evidence.6 8
Daniel D. Rubino

ARTICLE 45-EVIDENCE

CPLR 4503(a): Identity of third party who retains attorney for
criminal defendant not protected by attorney-clientprivilege
The attorney-client privilege, codified in CPLR 4503(a), prohibits the disclosure of confidential communications made by a cli(2d Cir. 1946).
e See note 39 supra.
6 49 N.Y.2d at 647, 404 N.E.2d at 1299, 427 N.Y.S.2d at 757 (Meyer, J., dissenting);
Ando v. Woodberry, 8 N.Y.2d 165, 167, 168 N.E.2d 520, 521, 203 N.Y.S.2d 74, 75-76 (1960);
1 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 10, at 293 (3d ed. 1940). For an extensive analysis of the admissibility of logically probative evidence see Thayer, Presumptions and the Law of Evidence, 3
HARV. L. REV. 141 (1889).
8 The power of a trial court to exclude technically admissible evidence may be founded
upon such considerations as undue consumption of time, repetition, unfair surprise or undue prejudice to one of the opposing parties. See Radosh v. Shipstad, 20 N.Y.2d 504, 508,
231 N.E.2d 759, 762, 285 N.Y.S.2d 60, 63 (1967); People v. Caruso, 246 N.Y. 437, 444, 159
N.E. 390, 392 (1927); People v. Harris, 209 N.Y. 70, 82, 102 N.E. 546, 550 (1913). The New
York courts have employed a balancing test to determine the admissibility of evidence-weighing its probative value against these countervailing policy considerations. See,
e.g., People v. Duffy, 36 N.Y.2d 258, 262-63, 326 N.E.2d 804, 807, 367 N.Y.S.2d 236, 240,
cert. denied, 423 U.S. 861 (1975); People v. Sandoval, 34 N.Y.2d 371, 375, 314 N.E.2d 413,
416, 357 N.Y.S.2d 849, 854 (1974); People v. Schwartzman, 24 N.Y.2d 241, 247, 247 N.E.2d
642, 646, 299 N.Y.S.2d 817, 823, cert. denied, 396 U.S. 846 (1969).

